‘In both Europe and North America it can be argued that the associational and institutional dimensions of the right to freedom of religion or belief are increasingly coming under pressure. This book demonstrates why a more classical understanding of the idea of a liberal democracy can allow for greater respect for the right to freedom of religion or belief.
The book examines the major direction in which liberal democracy has developed over the last fifty years and contends that this is not the most legitimate type of liberal democracy for religiously divided societies. Drawing on theoretical developments in the field of transnational constitutionalism, Hans-Martien ten Napel argues that redirecting the concept and practice of liberal democracy toward the more classical notion of limited, constitutional government, with a considerable degree of autonomy for civil society organizations would allow greater religious pluralism. The book shows how in a post-secular and multicultural context, modern sources of constitutionalism and democracy, supplemented by premodern, transcendental legitimation, continue to provide the best means of legitimating Western constitutional and political orders.’
‘On Friday 12 March 2010 HiiL organised an expert meeting on the theme National Constitutions and Globalisation. The topic relates directly to HiiL’s research theme Transnational Constitutionality. This particular meeting was held in the concrete context of a possible amendment of the Dutch Constitution, and with a view to contributing insights to the work of the State Commission for Review of the Constitution (Staatscommissie Herziening Grondwet) which, at the request of the Dutch Government, is presently drafting a report on the desirability of amending the Dutch Constitution.’
For the seminar program, seminar report and more, see:
‘HiiL Innovating Justice helps turn the most promising and disruptive ideas into effective innovations by bringing together the best legal experts, cutting-edge technology, and new types of funding. We differ because we put the users of the justice system first.’